Elgin, C. (2010). Persistent disagreements. In R. Feldman – T. Warfield (Eds.), Disagrement (p. 53-68). New York: Oxford University Press. The correlations it produces fail because of all the high-bar tests that a complex world requires of us. At each level of this document, there is the possibility of entering the world of multiple causality, but the author does not go there. For example, if only a percentage of immigrants are used as a positively correlated kinship measure, demographic, economic and social pressures that can lead to strong or low kinship in a given geography are not taken into account. The use of a bivist relationship between the (supposed) kinship and the work of the police also ignores several pilots of increased vigilance. And using only a bivariate relationship between police and crime is a disservice to the existence of a vast, multidisciplinary and ever-changing crime science.
These three categories of reasons offer different plausible explanations: among the scientists in dispute is a more competent group than the other, the scientific work of one or both groups is influenced by specific values or interests, or the subject is too complex and uncertain that scientists (currently) might converge on an answer. These reasons do not cover all possibilities of explaining scientific quarrels, as social democratic and other arguments in sociology and scientific philosophy have shown over the years [51, 52]. However, the same literature shows that these causes are certainly active in scientific work. If lay people tried to use these statements to determine which party is most likely to face a scientific dispute, they might have evidence to judge (especially for bias, probably the least jurisdiction [53, 54]). Although we are still a relatively new subject of study, we have made considerable progress in understanding the perceptions of lay people about the reasons for scientific conflicts. First, a measure has been developed to assess the perceived reasons for such litigation between groups of scientists, which is both highly reliable and reproducible in all U.S. samples. Second, we have preliminary evidence that these responsibilities are motivated more by attitudes and beliefs than by objective knowledge and skills. Third, we are beginning to get enough traction to include some of the major themes in future research efforts. For example, are perceptions more marked by attributes of people or situations? How could alternative explanations affect scientific authority, scientific advice and other possible consequences? How can we improve scientific communication in light of these findings? We are excited about the prospects and encourage other scientists to participate in broadening our understanding of this aspect of science and society. The real scientific controversies (the first two species listed above) are healthy and have differences of opinion on how the data should be interpreted, on the ideas most supported by the available evidence, and on ideas worth studying. This type of catalyst triggers a careful review of data and additional research and can thus help science move forward.
However, other types of controversies can have implications for science in different ways. Conflicts between scientific ideas and non-scientific views, for example, can hinder science if the controversy puts an end to research in controversial fields. With credit cards, nothing will resolve your “disagreement” with your friend. In science, we continue to explore, hoping that we will be able to meet everyone`s standards. In the early 1900s, Albert Einstein did just that. He calculated exactly how a microscopic but visible particle should behave when it collided with invisible atoms – a phenomenon called brownian motion.