Our interpretation of the text is supported by the framework of Article III, paragraph 8, point b), which will be examined with respect to Articles III:2 and III:4 of the 1994 GATT. In addition, the purpose and purpose of Article III, paragraph 8, point b), are confirmed by the drafting history of Article III. In this context, we recall the following discussion in the reports of the committees and major sub-committees of the Interim Commission for the International Trade Organization, on the provision of the Havana Charter for an international trade organisation, which is in accordance with Article III:8 (b) of the 1994 GATT: the non-discrimination and national treatment provisions aim to ensure a fair trading conditions. In addition, dumping (export at a loss to gain market share) and subsidies. The issues are complex and the rules attempt to determine what is right or wrong and how governments can respond, including by imposing additional import duties, which are calculated to compensate for the damage caused by unfair trafficking. 73. … Article 18 and Chapter IV, Section C, of the Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization are in accordance with Article III and Article XVI of the 1947 GATT. Return to the Text National treatment also applies to imported products as soon as they enter the market (they should be treated as locally produced goods), foreign and domestic services, as well as foreign and local trademarks, copyright and patents. … in order to meet the national treatment obligation, less favourable treatment must be compensated and eliminated in each individual situation as part of a measure. For this U.S.
argument to be successful, it must therefore apply to all Cuban original owners of American brands, not just some of them. Indoor treatments are generally considered desirable. But it can`t always be. In theory, the concept allows a state to effectively deprive foreigners of all property rights or rights that that state also deprives its own citizens of. The United States has not demonstrated, as requested under the national treatment obligation, that the U.S. courts would not confirm, on a case-by-case basis, the exercise of rights by a U.S. law holder. Even if, as the United States asserts, it is likely that the U.S.
courts would not apply the rights invoked by a U.S. right holder, but the fact remains that, in a situation inherently unfavourable to the United States, non-U.S. rights holders will find themselves in a situation inherently unfavourable to that of U.S. rights holders. And even if we accepted the U.S. argument on the doctrine of non-recognition of foreign recovery, that doctrine would probably apply to both those who are not U.S. nationals and those who are. Any application of this doctrine would therefore not compensate for the discrimination referred to in section 211, period (a) (2), as it would constitute another distinct obstacle to which nationals and foreigners would face in the same way. It would therefore not compensate for the effect of Section 211, (a) 2), which applies only to interest rate holders who are not U.S.
nationals. The system seeks to improve predictability and stability in other ways. One option is to prevent the use of quotas and other measures to limit the quantities of imports that manage quotas can lead to bureaucracy and accusations of unfair gambling. Another is to make countries` trade rules as clear and public (transparent) as possible.